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Abstract—This work considers the issue of distributing con-
tents to vehicles through roadside communication infrastructure.
Within this scenario, this work studies the dynamics of infras-
tructure deployment by using game theoretic tools. A strategic
game is used to model the case in which the operators perform
their deployment decisions concurrently, whereas an extensive
game is used to study the dynamics in case one operator is
the deployment leader and moves first. The equilibria of the
aforementioned games are then assessed as a function of several
parameters (nominal infrastructure capacity, interference, vehicle
flows). Simulations are used to validate the analytical findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we focus on the vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communication paradigm for VANETs and try to provide
insights into one of the recurring problems therein, i.e., that of
information exchange with passing vehicles. Specifically, we
assume that a road segment must be equipped for information
dissemination through the deployment of infrastructure nodes,
called Road Side Units (RSUs). We also assume that vehicles
are equipped with embedded communication devices, here-
inafter named On-Board Units (OBU), capable of exchanging
information content with RSUs. In such a scenario, we ask
ourselves the following question: if competing providers wish
to select locations where to deploy their RSUs in order to
provide or collect data to/from passing vehicles, what kind
of strategies should they follow? The answer, predictably,
depends on several factors: vehicle density, data traffic patterns
and sizes, presence of incumbent operators, to name a few.
Several works in the literature have addressed the problem
of the deployment of RSUs for vehicular access. Basic RSU
deployments have been proposed with the aim of enhancing
connectivity in urban VANETs [1], and for delay-tolerant
routing among vehicles [2], or targeting timely content dissem-
ination [3], [4]. Alternatively, the formulation in [5] targets a
minimum coverage guarantee, while the one in [6] maximizes
the minimum contact opportunity between vehicles and RSUs.
Finally, the work in [7] aims at finding the RSU deployment
that maximizes the throughput while accounting for airtime
conflicts due to the presence of an arbitrary number of vehi-
cles. Unlike the works above, where the RSU infrastructure is
owned by a single operator, we aim at studying the dynam-
ics of scenarios where different operators may competitively
deploy their RSUs to attract the largest number of customers.
In the present work, without purporting to provide a com-
prehensive solution, (i) we set the problem of RSU deployment
that maximizes the revenue for a content provider within
the framework of game theory; (ii) we derive preliminary
results, that can be extended for a more general approach to
the problem and (iii) we verify the validity of our approach
through simulation.
II. REFERENCE SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
We consider a scenario with two operators O1 and O2,
which would like to deploy Road Side Units (RSUs) for
distributing content along a stretch of road of length D.
Each operator can deploy its RSUs at a subset of a set of
candidate sites J . Each RSU is characterized by a coverage
range R, which defines its service area, and by an application-
level goodput c for content delivery. The goodput depends
on the wireless technology the RSU is equipped with and
on the communication protocols used for content delivery.
Furthermore, in practice the goodput might be affected by
physical layer impairments, interference, and collision with
other transmissions to/from the same or different RSUs.
We account for such impairments in the form of inter-RSU
interference, which is a function of the distance d between
the interfering RSUs, and determines the goodput that the
individual RSUs can achieve. We express the goodput of each
RSU at distance d as
c(d) =
c
1 + ω(d)
, (1)
where the interference function ω(d) is a monotone non-
increasing function of d. The interference function is bounded,
Ω = ω(0) ≥ ω(d) ≥ ω(D) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ d ≤ D. The as-
sumption of monotone non-increasingness is rather reasonable,
since the interference level usually does not increase when
interferers move away. Furthermore, we consider the relevant
case when Ω > 1. As an example, if two RSUs are deployed
at the same candidate location then they could use a MAC
protocol to share the physical medium, and their total capacity
would be 2c1+Ω < c.
There is a bidirectional flow of vehicles on the considered
stretch of road; λA is the intensity of the flow of vehicles
from left to right, and λB is the intensity from right to
left. The vehicles move at some constant speed v[m/s]. Each
vehicle aims to retrieve some content with an average size
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Fig. 1. Reference scenario with two candidate sites at the two extremes of
the stretch of road.
of S[bits], Depending on the content size, multiple MAC
layer frames may be required to accomplish the content
download. Content retrieval is attempted from the first met
RSU along the road upon completion of a standard association
procedure. In case multiple RSUs (from different operators)
are available simultaneously, the RSU association is done
at random. A content download is successful if the vehicle
manages to retrieve the content before leaving the coverage
area of the RSU. If the content retrieval is unsuccesful, the
vehicle attempts to download the content via the next RSU
encountered along the road. We define the offered load as
ρA = λAS and ρB = λBS in the two directions, respectively.
This definition of load does not consider factors such as the
number of vehicles in the coverage area, the content size, or
the ratio of successful content retrievals, but it is appropriate
for our purposes. We consider that the revenue of an operator
in a deployment is proportional to the traffic load it serves,
that is, to the number of vehicles that successfully get service
through the operator’s RSU. Figure 1 shows a scenario with
two candidate sites for RSU deployment (J = {A,B}) at the
two extremes of a stretch of road.
III. RSU DEPLOYMENT GAMES
We consider a scenario where operators i (i ∈ {1, 2}) can
deploy a single RSU each at one of two candidate locations
A and B at distance D, as shown in Fig. 1. The goal of each
operator is to maximize its own revenue. We consider that D is
large enough so that the interference between RSUs deployed
at different candidate sites is negligible, i.e., ω(D) = 0. Our
results can be easily generalized to non-zero interference, and
as we will see, even the simple case of two locations gives
rise to a rich set of solutions.
Clearly, the deployment choice of operator O1 influences
the revenue of operator O2, and vice versa, and the operators’
choices influence what portion of the offered traffic will be
served. Let us denote by ρuA (ρuB) the unserved traffic offered
by vehicles traveling from left to right (right to left). If the two
RSUs are colocated then the operators share a total revenue of
max[ρA + ρB,
2c
1+Ω ], and the unserved traffic is ρ
u
A = ρ
u
B =
max[0, (ρA+ρB−
2c
1+Ω )/2]. Consider now that the RSUs are
not colocated, and denote by ρsA (ρsB) the spill-over offered
traffic after passing the first RSU location.
We can consequently define the socially optimal RSU
deployment as the deployment that minimizes the sum of the
unserved traffic, i.e., ρuA + ρuB .
Fig. 2. (ρA, ρB)-space partition.
A. Simultaneous Deployment
Let us consider first that the two operators make their
deployment choices simultaneously, based on the traffic loads
ρA and ρB . We can model the problem as a strategic game
and we are interested in the efficiency of the Nash Equilibria
(NE) of the game, which is quantified by the Price of Anarchy
(PoA), i.e., the ratio of the total revenue in social optimum
and the smallest total revenue in any NE. For the case of
simultaneous deployment we can state the following.
Proposition 3.1: For the RSU deployment game the price
of anarchy is: PoA ≤ 1 + Ω.
Proof: In the case when the traffic intensity is symmetric,
ρA = ρB , the equilibria are easy to obtain. If 2c1+Ω ≥ ρA +
ρB then any deployment is a NE, while colocation is not an
equilibrium otherwise. Furthermore, all equilibria are socially
optimal, hence PoA = 1.
In the case when the traffic intensity is asymmetric the
number and efficiency of the equilibria depend on the re-
lationship between the offered traffic ρA, ρB , and the RSU
capacity c. Without loss of generality we can assume that
ρA > ρB . For convenience, let us divide the (ρA, ρB)-space
in three partitions, as shown in Fig. 2: (1) ρA+ρB < 2c1+Ω , (2)
ρA+ρB > 2c, and (3) 2c1+Ω < ρA+ρB < 2c. Partition (3) can
further be divided into three partitions. In the following, we
analyze the equilibria for the resulting five partitions shown
in Fig. 2.
1) Colocation Underload (Partition 1): The total capacity
of the RSUs is higher than the total offered traffic even under
colocated deployment, i.e., 2c1+Ω > ρA + ρB . The NE is
(A,A), and the operators have equal revenues. Note that in
the equilibrium there is no unserved traffic (ρuB = 0, ρuA = 0),
hence the NE is socially optimal.
2) Overload (Partition 2): The offered traffic is higher than
the combined RSU capacity, i.e., 2c < ρA + ρB . In this case
for any Ω > 0 there are two NE, (A,B) and (B,A). To
see why, note that in both NE ρuB > 0 and ρuA > 0. Since
both RSUs are fully utilized no player could benefit from
colocation. Furthermore, both NE are socially optimal because
each operator obtains a revenue c, which is greater than c1+Ω
with colocation.
3) Colocation Overload (Partition 3.a): The total offered
traffic exceeds the capacity of colocated RSUs, a colocated
RSU can serve one flow entirely, whereas the other flow
requires the capacity of a non-colocated RSU, i.e., ρA < c,
ρB <
c
1+Ω , ρA+ρB >
2c
1+Ω , In this case (A,A) is the unique
NE. Observe that under colocation both operators would obtain
c
1+Ω revenue, while under non-colocation one operator would
obtain ρB < c1+Ω (because ρsA = 0). In this case the NE is not
socially optimal, as non-colocation, which is not a NE, gives
a higher revenue, ρA + ρB . The price of anarchy is
PoA =
(ρA + ρB)(1 + Ω)
2c
< 1 + Ω,
the inequality holds as ρA + ρB < c+ c1+Ω < 2c.
4) Colocation Overload (Partition 3.b): The offered traffic
from both directions exceeds the capacity of colocated RSUs
but both flows can be served by non-colocated RSUs, that is,
c
1+Ω < ρB, ρA < c. In this case there are two NE, (A,B)
and (B,A). In both NE all traffic is served, hence the NE are
socially optimal and PoA = 1.
5) Asymmetric Overload (Partition 3.c): The traffic from
left to right exceeds the RSU capacity but the total offered
traffic is less than the total RSU capacity, i.e., ρA > c and
ρA + ρB < 2c.
The game admits different equilibria depending on the
values of ρA, ρB , and Ω. We can identify two regions in
partition (3.c). Region I where ρA > c and ρA+ρB < c+ c1+Ω
and Region II where c + c1+Ω < ρA + ρB < 2c. Following
similar arguments as for the previous cases we can state the
following.
Lemma 3.2: In the case of asymmetric overload the NE are
NE =
{
{(A,A)} if (ρA, ρB) ∈ Region I
{(A,B), (B,A)} if (ρA, ρB) ∈ Region II
(2)
The NE (A,B) and (B,A) are socially optimal, so for the
price of anarchy we can state the following.
Lemma 3.3: In the case of asymmetric overload the price
of anarchy is
PoA =


(ρA + ρB)(1 + Ω)
2c
if (ρA, ρB) ∈ Region I
1 if (ρA, ρB) ∈ Region II
(3)
Since ρA+ ρB < 2c we have PoA ≤ 1+Ω, which concludes
the proof.
B. Leader/Follower Deployment
Let us now consider the scenario where one of the two op-
erators is the market leader and has the first-move advantage.
We can model the problem as an extensive-form game and
we are interested in its sub-game perfect NE. The NE derived
in Section III-A for partitions 1, 2, and 3.a in Fig. 2 can be
easily shown to be sub-game perfect. Nevertheless, not all NE
in partitions 3.b and 3.c are sub-game perfect.
1) Colocation Overload (Partition 3.b): From the two NE
(A,B) and (B,A) only (A,B) is sub-game perfect. Indeed,
the two NE have revenues (ρA, ρB) and (ρB, ρA), respectively.
Since, ρA > ρB , operator O1 will deploy its RSU in A, thus,
the best choice for operator O2 will be to choose B, and hence
the revenue for the first-mover O1 is greater than in (B,A).
2) Asymmetric Overload (Partition 3.c): Given our defini-
tion of the revenue, the following can be verified.
Lemma 3.4: In the case of asymmetric overload the sub-
game perfect NE are
NE =
{
{(A,A)} if (ρA, ρB) ∈ Region I
{(A,B)} if (ρA, ρB) ∈ Region II
(4)
Finally, we note that the price of anarchy in the case of
leader/follower deployment equals that of the simultaneous
deployment. This can be easily seen by comparing the set
of NE to the set of sub-game perfect NE.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we validate the analytical model via simula-
tions in the ns-3 simulator. All vehicles travel at the constant
speed of 20 m/s. After reaching the opposite end of the road,
each vehicle is removed from the simulation. We make the
conservative assumption that vehicles’ OBUs communicate
with RSUs using IEEE 802.11a at the basic rate of 6 Mb/s,
regardless of the distance from the RSU, and that the coverage
area of an RSU is 200 m. The mobility model is chosen to be
the ns-3 constant velocity model.
Upon transiting under the coverage of RSUs, an OBU first
listens for their beacon (transmitted every second), then tries to
associate with one of them (picked randomly if more than one
beacon is received). Finally, if successful, it starts uploading
its content to the selected RSU by using MAC frames that
can carry 1 kB of application data. If the transfer completes
before the vehicles leaves the RSU coverage, the transfer is
marked as successful. Otherwise, it counts as a failure, and
the OBU will try to repeat the procedure upon coming under
the coverage of another RSU (if any).
We consider two scenarios.The colocated scenario refers to
both RSUs occupying the same candidate site (either A or
B) and transmitting on the same channel. The disjoint (non-
colocated) scenario is the one shown in Fig. 1, where the
candidate sites are 600 m apart. In each plot we denote by “loc.
A, alone” (resp. “loc. B, alone”) the performance of the RSU
in location A (resp. B) in the disjoint scenario; by “colocated”
the performance of one RSU in the colocated scenario; and
by “tot. disjoint” (resp. “tot. colocated”)the performance of the
two RSUs in the disjoint (resp. colocated) scenario.
We first study the case where the ratio of the left-to-right and
right-to-left vehicle arrival rates (i.e., λA/λB = 10) is fixed. In
Fig. 3 we plot the number of successfully transmitted contents
(whose size is fixed at 500 kB for each vehicle). It is interesting
to observe that, with these settings, whoever occupies location
A first has the upper hand at low to medium traffic intensities.
These results match the model predictions for the Colocation
Underload case.
If the vehicle arrival rate increases, colocation is not a good
choice for the newcomer, who fares better on its own, i.e., non-
colocation becomes the NE as predicted in the Overload case.
Interestingly, the disjoint solution provides an advantage for
the incumbent who selected location A only up to (λA <1.5
veh/s): at higher rates, its RSU cannot serve all vehicles and
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Fig. 3. Constant arrival imbalance: successful transmissions as a function of
left-to-right vehicle flow intensity
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Fig. 4. Variable arrival imbalance: successful transmissions as a function of
left-to-right vehicle flow intensity
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
Co
nt
en
ts
 o
ffe
re
d
Content size [kB]
loc. A, alone
loc. B, alone
colocated
tot., disjoint
tot., colocated
Fig. 5. Variable content size: number of offered contents as a function of the
content size
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Fig. 6. Variable content size: number of successfully transmitted contents as
a function of the content size
the spillover benefits location B, which again matches the
performance of its competitor.
We next consider the effect of the imbalance between the
flows in opposite directions in Fig. 4. We set λB = 0.05 veh/s,
and vary λA between 0.1 and 2 veh/s. The content size is again
fixed at 500 kB for each vehicle.
It can be seen that, as the rate of the left-to-right flow
increases with respect to the opposite direction, location A
becomes preferable. The newcomer’s best choice is location
B if λA is below 0.5 veh/s (which matches the Colocation
Overload (3.b) case). However, for higher rates, colocation
becomes preferable for the newcomer, as it guarantees more
successful transmissions, as predicted by the Colocation Over-
load (3.a) case. We also remark that, as expected, this NE
is not socially-optimal, as can be seen by the much higher
combined revenues in the disjoint case.
Finally, we look at the case of variable content size, which
results in variable load offered to the RSUs. The arrival rates
are fixed at λA = 0.5 and λB = 0.05 veh/s. Recall that if an
OBU does not complete the transfer before leaving the RSU
coverage, it will try afresh at the next RSU. This is shown in
Fig. 5, where a sudden surge in offered traffic at location B
can be detected for content sizes in excess of 300 kB.
A final look at Fig. 6 reveals that, for the chosen arrival
rates, the content size increase does not affect the equilibria,
but merely closes the gap between revenues achievable at
disjoint locations.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we looked at the problem of infrastructure
deployment in VANETs through the lenses of game theory.
We considered both simultaneous as well as leader-follower
deployment, and quantified the inefficiency of equilibrium
deployments compared to the social optimum. We then ver-
ified through simulations that, notwithstanding the necessary
simplifications, our model correctly predicted the reachable
equilibria as a function of traffic intensity.
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